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1. These provisions are part
of the so-called ‘six-pack’, a
set of legislative acts result-
ing from proposals made by
the European Commission
and from the report on eco-
nomic governance in the EU
prepared by Herman Van
Rompuy, the president of
the European Council.  The
‘six-pack’ was adopted by
the European Parliament
and the Council on 16
November 2011.
2. See the ‘Euro Summit
Statement’ of 26 October
2011.
3. Speech by Mario Draghi,
1 December 2011.
4. Statement by euro-area
heads of state and govern-
ment, 9 December 2011.
5. Interestingly, the Euro-
pean Commission report on
the first ten years of EMU
(European Commission,
2008) emphasised the
errors resulting from the
neglect of non-fiscal dimen-
sions such as competitive-
ness, credit booms and
current-account deficits. For
this reason the six-pack leg-
islation introduced a new
procedure called the Exces-
sive Imbalances Procedure
to address external imbal-
ances. However subsequent
policy discussions have
refocused on fiscal issues.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the euro crisis erupted in early 2010, the
European policy discussion has mostly
emphasised its fiscal roots. Beyond short-term
assistance, reflection on reform has focused on
the need to strengthen fiscal frameworks at
European Union and national levels. The sequence
of decisions and proposals is telling:
• In 2011, the EU adopted new legislation,
effective from 1 January 2012, that reinforces
preventive action against fiscal slippages, sets
minimum requirements for national fiscal
frameworks, toughens sanctions against
countries in excessive deficit and tightens up
enforcement through a change in the voting
procedure1.
• On 26 October 2011, the euro-area heads of
state and government decided to go further and
committed themselves to adopting constitu-
tional or near-constitutional rules on balanced
budgets in structural terms, to basing national
budgets on independent forecasts and, for
countries in an excessive deficit procedure, to
allowing examination of draft budgets by the
European Commission before they are adopted
by parliaments2. A few weeks later, in Novem-
ber 2011, the European Commission put for-
ward proposals for new legislation requiring
euro-area member states to give the Commis-
sion the right to assess, and request revisions
to, draft national budgets before they are
adopted by parliament.
• Speaking in the European Parliament in early
December, European Central Bank President
Mario Draghi asked for a 'new fiscal compact'
which he defined as “a fundamental
restatement of the fiscal rules together with the
mutual fiscal commitments that euro-area
governments have made,” so that these
commitments “become fully credible,
individually and collectively”3.
• On 9 December 2011, EU heads of states and
government, with the significant exception of
the United Kingdom, committed themselves to
introducing fiscal rules stipulating that the
general government deficit must not exceed
0.5 percent of GDP in structural terms. They
also agreed on a new treaty that would allow
automatic activation of the sanction procedure
for countries in breach of the 3 percent of GDP
ceiling for budgetary deficits. Sanctions as
recommended by the European Commission
will be adopted unless a qualified majority of
euro-area member states is opposed4.
The question is, are the Europeans right to see the
strengthening of the fiscal framework as the main,
possibly the only, precondition for restoring trust
in the euro? Or is this emphasis misguided?
It is striking that in spite of a growing body of
literature drawing attention to the non-fiscal
aspects of the development of the crisis, other
problems that emerged during the euro crisis have
almost disappeared from the policy discussion at
top level5. Credit booms and the perverse effects
of negative real interest rates in countries where
credit to the non-traded sector gave rise to a
sustained rise in inflation were the focus of policy
discussions in the aftermath of the global crisis,
but these issues have largely disappeared from
the policy agenda at head-of-state level. Real
exchange rate misalignments within the euro
area, and current-account imbalances, are largely
considered to be of lesser importance, or mere
symptoms of the underlying fiscal imbalances.
Finally, the role of capital flows from northern to
southern Europe and their sudden reversal, are
merely discussed by academics and central
bankers, though the sudden reversal of north-south
capital flows inside the euro area is fragmenting
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the single market and creating major imbalances
within the Eurosystem of central banks6.
To address the issue I start in section 2 by briefly
reviewing the evidence on the link between fiscal
performance and market tensions. I then turn to
presenting in section 3 why the crisis has
revealed a more fundamental weakness in the
principles underpinning the euro area. In section
4, I discuss options for the way out. Policy
conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2 IS FISCAL DISCIPLINE THE ISSUE?
It is undoubtedly true that the euro area in its first
ten years suffered from a lack of fiscal discipline,
that from the standpoint of sustainability of public
finances good times were wasted, and that the
credibility of fiscal rules was compromised
(Schuknecht et al, 2011). Greece notoriously
misreported budgetary data and flouted the
European fiscal-discipline rules. In spite of having
promised that they would avoid ‘excessive
deficits’, and in spite of the thorough monitoring
done by the European Commission, from 1999 to
2008 six countries out of twelve (excluding recent
additions to the euro area) found themselves in
an 'excessive deficit' position. And the now-
infamous Council decision of 25 November 2003
to hold the excessive deficit procedure for France
and Germany 'in abeyance' is rightly regarded as
having weakened significantly the credibility of
the European fiscal framework.
Two observations however caution against an
exclusive emphasis on strengthening fiscal disci-
pline through tougher and more automatic rules.
First, behaviour vis-à-vis the rules of the European
fiscal framework (the Stability and Growth Pact or
SGP) is a very poor predictor of the difficulties
experienced nowadays by euro-area countries.
Figure 1 shows recent spreads vis-à-vis the
German Bund against past infringements of the
SGP7. It is apparent that there is no relationship
between the two: countries such as Ireland and
6. Recent contributions to
the literature on the non-
fiscal roots of the euro
crisis include De Grauwe
(2011), Gros (2011), Lane
and Pels (2011), and Sinn
and Wollmershaeuser
(2011).
7. In order to avoid the
result being biased by polit-
ical weight (for example, a
country could have escaped
being singled out as infring-
ing the SGP because of
political clout within the
Council of Ministers, which
votes on sanctions and the
steps leading to them), I
take instead the number of
years between the Euro-
pean Commission recom-
mendation that the country
be declared to be in exces-
sive deficit, up to its recom-
mendation of abrogation of
the excessive deficit proce-
dure. Data relating to the
excessive deficit procedure
is taken from the European
Commission’s website.
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‘The euro area in its first ten years suffered from a lack of fiscal discipline, while from the
standpoint of sustainability of public finances good times were wasted, and the credibility of
fiscal rules was compromised.’
Spain that were never found to have infringed the
rules, suffer from large spreads, whereas Germany
and the Netherlands, which were found guilty of it,
enjoy remarkably low rates. This suggests that the
simplistic view that a thorough enforcement of the
rules would have prevented the crisis should be
treated with caution.
The second piece of evidence is that several euro-
area countries are experiencing elevated
government-borrowing costs in spite of being in
much sounder positions than the US, the UK or
Japan. Calculations by the International Monetary
Fund (2011) suggest that future adjustments
facing non-euro area countries are of the same
order of magnitude as those confronting euro-area
countries in trouble. Pairwise, Japan and Ireland
seem to be in similar situations, as do the US and
Portugal. However, only the two euro-area
countries have experienced a rise in bond yields
(Figure 2).
As observed by Paul De Grauwe (2011), the
comparison between Spain and the UK is
particularly telling. Even taking into account the
potential cost of recapitalising Spanish banks, the
two countries face broadly similar fiscal
challenges (Figure 3), yet at the end of November
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Figure 1: SGP infringements (1999-2008) and
current bond yields (Sep-Nov 2011)
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission, Datastream.
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2011, Spanish 10-year bond rates were 6.5
percent against 2.3 percent in the UK. Yields on UK
gilts even reached a lower level than those on
comparable German bonds.
This comparison is prima facie evidence that the
fiscal situation per se fails to explain tension in the
euro-area government bond markets. Or, to put it
slightly differently, although their levels of deficit
and public debt are the same, euro-area countries
seem to be more vulnerable to fiscal crises than
non-euro area countries. Explanations for this
need to be considered.  
3 THE NEW IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY
To understand what makes euro-area states more
fragile, it is best to start from the basic tenets on
which the European currency is based. Three are
especially relevant: the absence of co-
responsibility for public debt; the strict
no-monetary financing rule; and bank-sovereign
interdependence, ie the combination of state
responsibility for supervising (and if necessary
rescuing) banking systems and the holding by
these very banks of large stocks of debt securities
issued by their sovereigns. 
No co-responsibility for public debt
Governments in the euro area are individually
responsible for the debt they have issued. It is
even prohibited for the EU or any of the national
governments to assume responsibility for the debt
issued by another member country. This principle,
known as the ‘no bail-out clause’, is enshrined in
the EU treaty, the relevant article of which (Art.
125) deserves to be quoted in full: “The Union
THE EURO CRISIS AND THE NEW IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY Jean Pisani-Ferry
03
/0
1/
07
17
/0
5/
07
28
/0
9/
07
11
/0
2/
08
24
/0
6/
08
05
/1
1/
08
19
/0
3/
09
31
/0
7/
09
14
/1
2/
09
27
/0
4/
10
08
/0
9/
10
20
/0
1/
11
03
/0
6/
11
17
/1
0/
11
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Gr
ee
ce
Ja
pa
n
Ire
la
nd US
Po
rt
ug
al UK
Sp
ai
n
Fr
an
ce
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Ita
ly
Be
lg
iu
m
Ge
rm
an
y0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Required budgetary adjustment (% of GDP) 10-year government bond yields
Japan
US
Portugal
Ireland
Figure 2: Required 2010-2020 budgetary adjustments and government bond yields
Source: Left panel: IMF (2011). The bar represents the adjustment in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance required to
reduce the debt ratio to 60 per cent in 2030, assuming constant CAPB between 2020 and 2030. Calculation assumes a uni-
form interest rate-growth rate differential. Right panel: Datastream
General govt. net lending/borrowing (%GDP) General government gross debt (%GDP)
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Spain
United Kingdom
Forecast
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
United Kingdom
Spain
Forecast
Figure 3: Government deficit and public debt in Spain and the UK, 1995-2013
Source: AMECO database and European Commission forecasts of November 2011.
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8. Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry
and Sapir (2010) discuss
why the EU could not rely
on its traditional balance-of-
payment assistance instru-
ments and explain why the
exclusion of euro-area
members from this assis-
tance cannot be regarded
as resulting from the no-
bail-out clause.
9. Shortly after Greece
joined the euro in 2001,
rating agencies upgraded
its status to upper invest-
ment-grade levels. Accord-
ing to Sara Bertin, then
Greece analyst at Moody’s,
this was done in “the belief
that Greece was now part of
the euro zone and that
nobody was ever going to
default”. See Julie Creswell
and Graham Bowley, ‘Rat-
ings firms misread signs of
Greek woes’, The New York
Times, 29 November 2011.
10. See Buiter and Sibert
(2005) for an early discus-
sion of ECB collateral policy.
shall not be liable for or assume the commitments
of central governments, regional, local or other
public authorities, other bodies governed by public
law, or public undertakings of any Member State,
without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees
for the joint execution of a specific project. A
Member State shall not be liable for or assume the
commitments of central governments, regional,
local or other public authorities, other bodies
governed by public law, or public undertakings of
another Member State, without prejudice to mutual
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a
specific project”.
In plain English this means that sovereign default
is a risk to consider, and the rationale for this
provision was indeed to set the rules of the game
clearly and ensure that markets would price
sovereign risk accordingly. Unlike in the US, where
the no bail-out principle emerged over a long
period (Henning and Kessler, 2012), the aim was
to prevent moral hazard and thereby to provide
from the start clear incentives for governments to
abide by fiscal discipline.
No provision unfortunately stated what would
happen in the event of a euro-area sovereign
losing access to the market. One possible
interpretation of the treaty was that it would have
to restructure its public debt. A second one is that
it would have to turn to the IMF and be subject to
standard procedures for conditional support or, if
needed, insolvency. A third one was that despite
the lack of an instrument to this end, the other
euro-area member states would find ways to
provide temporary conditional assistance. There
was therefore significant ambiguity in the
interpretation of one of the treaty’s fundamental
principles8.
For ten years, from 1999 to 2008, markets in fact
did not differentiate euro-area borrowers
significantly (Figure 4). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there was a
widely held view that in case of problems, the no
bail-out principle would not be strictly enforced9.
Why markets failed to price sovereign risk
appropriately is a matter for discussion; however
it is clear that from banking regulation (until Basel
II started to be implemented in the late 2000s,
sovereign bonds were deemed risk-free) to ECB
collateral policy (bonds issued by all euro-area
sovereigns were treated similarly), policy in the
first decade of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) contributed to the narrowing of spreads10.
It is only when the Greek crisis erupted and
markets realised that Greece might have to default
on part of its debt, that perceptions changed and
the sovereign risk began to be priced in the bond
market.
Strict no-monetary financing
The second tenet is the strict prohibition of
monetary financing. Art. 123 of the EU Treaty
states that “Overdraft facilities or any other type of
credit facility with the European Central Bank or
with the central banks of the Member States
(hereinafter referred to as ‘national central
banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies,
offices or agencies, central governments, regional,
local or other public authorities, other bodies
governed by public law, or public undertakings of
Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the
purchase directly from them by the European
Central Bank or national central banks of debt
instruments”.
This article can be read as a prohibition of
institutionalised fiscal dominance in the form of
explicit agreements between a government and a
central bank similar to the Fed-Treasury
agreement of 1942, which set the US central bank
the goal of maintaining “relatively stable prices
Jean Pisani-Ferry  THE EURO CRISIS AND THE NEW IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY
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11. See for example Wood-
ford (2009).
12. Whether or not this
insurance amounts to an
implicit guarantee of debt
monetisation is a matter for
discussion. Central banks
generally maintain that
they would not preserve the
sovereign from funding
crises in case of unsustain-
able fiscal policy but that
they would act to prevent
self-fulfilling debt crises.
and yields for government securities”11. The ECB
still has the option of buying government bonds
on the secondary market and actually it made use
of this with the launch of the so-called Security
Markets Programme in May 2010, first to
purchase Greek and Portuguese bonds and later,
in August 2011, to purchase Italian and Spanish
bonds (for a total amount of about €200 billion at
end-November 2011). But the provision is
indicative of a broader philosophy of strict
separation between fiscal and monetary policy,
and the purchase of government securities makes
the ECB clearly uncomfortable.
Furthermore, the ECB does not have a strong
financial-stability mandate that could justify
intervention to prevent turmoil on the bond
market. Its mandate is only to “contribute to the
smooth conduct of policies pursued by the
competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability
of the financial system” (Art. 127-5). The reason
given by the ECB for the launch of the Security
Markets Programme was in fact not the
preservation of financial stability, but rather the
prevention of disruption to the proper
transmission of monetary policy decisions.
In this respect the ECB is a very special type of
central bank compared to other monetary
institutions that are not constrained by the
prohibition of purchases of government bonds and
have often been given an explicit financial
stability mandate. To the extent that such central
banks are seen by markets as ready to embark on
wholesale bond purchases if required in the name
of financial stability, they provide an implicit
insurance to the sovereign and contribute to the
avoidance of multiple equilibria12. This is not the
case with the ECB.
Banks-sovereign interdependence
The third important tenet is bank-sovereign
interdependence, which results from both policy
principles and the inherited structures of national
financial systems.
Whereas the euro area is integrated monetarily,
banking systems are still largely national. To start
with, states are individually responsible for
rescuing banks in their jurisdictions. As a
consequence, states are highly vulnerable to the
cost of banking crises – especially when they are
home to banks with significant cross-border
activities. In 2010, total bank assets amounted to
45 times government tax receipts in Ireland, and
the ratio was very high in several other countries
(Figure 5).  
The consequences of this situation became
apparent when Ireland had to rescue its banking
system after it suffered heavy losses in the credit
boom of the 2000s. Ireland at the end of 2007 had
a 25 percent debt-to-GDP ratio and it was deemed
a fiscally super-sound country. At the end of 2011
its debt ratio was evaluated at 108 percent and
the country had had to file for an IMF-EU
conditional assistance programme. But Ireland is
only an extreme case: in fact, all western European
sovereigns in the euro area (but much less so the
new member states, where banks are largely
foreign-owned) are heavily exposed to the risk of
having to rescue domestic banks.
The other side of the coin is that banks are
exposed to their own governments through their
holdings of debt securities. Figure 6, which reports
data for 2007, the last year before the global
financial crisis, shows that this was at least true
for the continental European countries, where
banks held large sovereign-debt portfolios, though
much less so for Ireland where, as in the UK and
the US, banks do not (or at least did not) hold
much government debt. 
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Bank holdings of government securities would not
represent a risk if they were diversified, but in fact
they are heavily biased towards the sovereign
(Figure 7). This home bias is apparent in most
euro-area countries and it implies that whenever
the sovereign finds itself in a precarious situation,
banks are weakened as a consequence. This for
example happened in Greece, where banks are
relatively strong but are highly vulnerable to the
risk of default of the Greek sovereign.
Home bias diminished after the introduction of the
euro eliminated currency risk, and regulations
that treated foreign euro-denominated bonds dif-
ferently from national bonds were scrapped. As
pointed out by Lane (2005, 2006) and Waysand,
Ross and de Guzman (2010), EMU triggered a sig-
nificant increase in cross-border bond investment
within the euro area, beyond the diversification of
portfolios resulting from financial globalisation.
Nevertheless, as late as in 2010 domestic home
bias persisted to a surprising degree13.
As banks held significant government bond
portfolios, and as these portfolios exhibited a
home bias, in 2007 about one-fourth of the bonds
issued by the state were held by domestic banks
in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Table 1).
The proportion was less, but still noticeable, in
France, the Netherlands and Greece. Only in
Ireland were banks negligible holders of
government securities.
Furthermore, the exposure of domestic banks to
sovereign risk increased in recent times as they
largely substituted non-residents in countries
subject to market pressure. In fact, between 2007
and mid-2011 the share of outstanding debt held
by domestic banks increased markedly in Greece,
Portugal and Ireland, and to a lesser extent in
Spain and Italy, while it decreased significantly in
Germany (Figure 8).
The exposure of governments to ‘their’ banks and
of banks to ‘their’ governments makes public
finances in the euro area particularly prone to
liquidity and solvency crises. Markets have
realised that such a configuration is a source of
significant vulnerability and they are pricing the
risk that governments go further into debt as a
consequence of bank weaknesses, or that banks
incur heavy losses as a consequence of their
sovereign holdings.
Jean Pisani-Ferry  THE EURO CRISIS AND THE NEW IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY
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Implications
The coexistence of these three tenets makes the
euro area unique. Existing federations may or may
not apply the no-coresponsibility principle
(arrangements in this respect vary); they may or
may not prevent the central bank from purchas-
ing government bonds (in fact they rarely do); but
they do not leave to states the responsibility for
rescuing banks, which in turn do not hold large
amounts of state and local government paper. In
the US in particular, (a) banks hold very little fed-
eral, let alone state and local debt; (b) the Federal
Reserve would be able to intervene to avoid the
federal government losing access to markets; (c)
the federal government has no responsibility for
state debt, and the federal government, not state
governments, is responsible for rescuing banks.
These features can be summarised in the form of
a trilemma. The euro was imagined in the late
1980s in response to what was known as
Mundell’s trilemma, according to which no country
can enjoy at the same time free capital flows,
stable exchange rates and independent monetary
policies. Twenty years later the euro area faces
another trilemma between the absence of co-
responsibility over public debt, the strict
no-monetary financing rule and the national
character of banking systems (Figure 9). 
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Table 1: Breakdown of govt debt. by holding sectors (% of total), selected countries, mid-2011
Domestic
banks
Central bank ECB Other public
institutions
Other
residents
Non-residents
(excl. ECB)
Greece 19.4 2.6 22.9 10.1 6.5 38.5
Ireland 16.9 n/a 16.1 0.9 2.43 63.8
Portugal 22.4 0.8 11.2 - 13.5 52.1
Italy 27.3 4.0 5.3 - 26.7 36.7
Spain 28.3 3.5 4.8 - 30.2 33.2
Germany 22.9 0.3 - 0.0 14.1 62.7
France 14.0 n/a - - 29.0 57.0
Netherlands 10.7 n/a - 1.1 21.4 66.8
UK 10.7 19.4 - 0.1 39.5 30.2
US 2.0 11.3 - 35.5 19.9 31.4
Source: Bruegel. Note: The variable considered is central government marketable debt for Greece (2011Q2); central govern-
ment long-term bonds for Ireland (2011Q2); general government debt for Portugal (2010Q4); general government debt for Italy
(2011Q2); general government debt for Spain (2011Q2); central, state and local government debt for Germany (2011Q1);
OATs for France (2011Q2); federal government treasury securities for the US (2011Q2) and central government gilts for the
UK (2011Q1). For Ireland, holdings by the National Central Bank are included in ‘domestic banks’ and not in ‘public institutions’,
due to data availability.
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This impossible trinity renders the euro area fragile
because adverse shocks to sovereign solvency
tend to interact perversely with adverse shocks to
bank solvency, and because the central bank is
constrained in its ability to provide liquidity to the
sovereigns in order to stem self-fulfilling debt
crises. Like the ‘old’ trilemma, the question about
the new one is which of the constraints will give
way. 
4 WHICH WAY FORWARD?
The euro area’s stated strategy to escape the
trilemma is budgetary consolidation. The goal is
for states to reach debt levels low enough to
ensure that solvency is beyond doubt. It is indeed
indisputable that public finances have to be
brought under control and that this requires
sustained budgetary consolidation. The question
is if this strategy is likely to deliver at a close
enough horizon. The already-mentioned IMF
simulations (Figure 2) suggest that this is
unlikely: to reach in 2030 a 60 percent of GDP debt
ratio, several countries have to implement
adjustments of unprecedented magnitude
amounting to 5 to 10 percent of GDP in France,
Spain and Portugal, and exceeding 10 percent of
GDP in Greece and Ireland. The economic
slowdown that started in the second half of 2011
and the acute recessions experienced by several
southern European countries only add to the
challenge14.
Furthermore, 60 percent of GDP is a very arbitrary
target. As discussed by the debt crisis literature,
defaults in emerging economies actually exhibit
lower ‘debt intolerance’ thresholds. Reinhart,
Rogoff and Savastano (2003) report that from
1971 to 2001, more than half of the default
episodes in middle-income countries took place
despite the debt ratio being lower than 60 percent
of GDP, while Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza
(2008) point out that a country’s public-finance
record may not be the only motive for low levels
of debt intolerance: inability to borrow in one’s own
currency (the ‘original sin’) matters quite a lot too.
Another factor is the size of the implicit liabilities
a state may have to take on. On the basis of the
recent experience, especially of Spain and Ireland,
it might well be that the safe threshold is
significantly below 60 percent of GDP. This would
postpone even further the landing on safe
territory.
Ultimately budgetary consolidation is
indispensable, but it is an illusion to assume that
by itself it will restore stability to the euro area. To
count on it would leave the euro area vulnerable
for many years. Furthermore precipitated
adjustments of the kind implemented in 2011 by
countries under market pressure tend to rely on
quick fiscal fixes and for this reason to be
detrimental to medium-term growth, thereby
adding to sustainability concerns. To ward off
threats to stability and cohesion, Europe needs to
move on other fronts too and to consider three
non-competing options corresponding to the three
points of the triangle. 
Give the ECB the role of lender-of-last-resort for
sovereigns
The first solution, which was widely discussed in
the autumn of 2011, is to give the ECB the role of
lender of last resort in relation to the sovereigns.
As in the case of a central bank vis-à-vis
commercial banks, this would not amount to
giving it the task of making insolvent countries
solvent. Rather, the ECB could either lend for a
limited period to a sovereign at a rate that is above
the risk-free rate but below the rate the sovereign
has to pay on the market; or, as in the Gros-Mayer
(2011) proposal, it would provide a credit line to a
public entity (the European Financial Stability
Facility, or EFSF, in the Gros-Mayer proposal) in
order to leverage its capital and give it enough
firepower. This entity would then intervene in the
market, preferably following a policy rule of some
sort. Either way, the ECB would provide liquidity to
prevent states from being cut off from financing,
and it would help put a ceiling on what they have
to pay to borrow, thereby stemming potentially
self-fulfilling debt crises. In a way, ECB support
would serve as a deterrent and it could well be that
governments would never have to draw on it.
There have been intense discussions in the euro
area about this approach, which was advocated
by many experts, expected by markets, endorsed
by several European governments, including
France, supported by the US, but in the end
resisted by Germany. The ECB has taken a step
14. These calculations were
made before the 26 October
agreement on Greek debt
reduction.
Jean Pisani-Ferry  THE EURO CRISIS AND THE NEW IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY
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towards it with the launch of the Security Markets
Programme, but its action has not been
demonstrably effective, in part because the
central bank acted half-heartedly and without
clear policy objectives.
As a permanent device, and even leaving aside
objections of principle, the ‘lender of last resort for
sovereigns’ approach however raises a number of
difficulties.
• First, the ECB does not have an explicit
mandate for it. Changing the mandate to
include financial stability would raise
considerable difficulties as it would require
unanimous agreement (of the 27 EU members,
because the ECB mandate is defined by a
provision of the Maastricht treaty).
• Second, beyond the mandate a key reason why
the ECB is uncomfortable buying government
paper is that unlike the Fed when it buys US
treasury bonds or the Bank of England when it
buys gilts, such a move inevitably involves
distributional dimensions. Should it incur
losses on its bond portfolio (not an abstract
possibility since it has already incurred losses
on its purchases), the ECB would have to
request from its shareholders the injection of
additional capital, thereby becoming the
vehicle for a transfer in favour of the countries
benefitting from the purchases.
• Third, the ECB does not have the right
governance for deciding on such actions.
Within its governing council, all governors of
national central banks have the same vote,
unlike in a shareholder-based organisation. A
coalition of small-country governors could thus
theoretically trigger intervention in favour of
their countries at the expense of the larger
countries which would contribute the bulk of
recapitalisation.
• Fourth, unconditional support, or support
associated with weak conditionality, is a recipe
for creating moral hazard, as illustrated by the
Italian parliamentary coalition’s response to
the initiation of bond purchases by the ECB: it
took only days for it to backtrack (temporarily
at least) on its fiscal commitments. The
problem for the ECB, however, is that it is not
equipped to exercise conditionality. Venturing
into this field is a risky strategy for an
institution whose independence hinges on the
specified character of its mandate.
None of these arguments is final enough to
prevent action in emergencies. But taken together
they suggest that there are significant legal and
political obstacles to giving the ECB a role
equivalent to those played by other major central
banks. Even assuming the Governing Council
would agree on playing this role, its commitment
would most probably lack the credibility that is
required to make this strategy effective, because
markets would anticipate the obstacles and the
limitations they would imply.
Break the banking crisis-sovereign crisis vicious
circle: (a) regulatory reforms
It has been long known that because it rules out
the possibility of inflating away crises, monetary
union necessarily increases the risk of sovereign
default. In the same way that countries that
borrow in foreign currency are more prone to
default, a country that borrows in a currency that
it does not control is also more prone to default.
This was indeed the very rationale behind the
prohibition of excessive deficits and the
surveillance of national budgetary policies. Long
before the fact, however, scholars such as Barry
Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz (1998) had
described how a sovereign crisis in the euro area
would spill over into the banking system and the
other sovereigns. Their conclusion was that the
efficient policy response would be “to tighten
supervision and inspection of European banks
rather than placing fiscal authorities in a
straightjacket”.
‘There are significant legal and political obstacles to giving the ECB a role equivalent to those
played by other major central banks. Even assuming the Governing Council would agree to play
this role, its commitment would most probably lack the credibility that is required.’
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Until very recently, however, bank and insurance
regulation overlooked this logic. As already
discussed, exposure to a sovereign was
considered safe but there were furthermore no
limits to exposure to a particular sovereign and as
a consequence, banks and insurers were not given
incentives to diversify. Consistent with the
recognition that sovereign bonds are not risk-free,
a case can therefore be made for reforming
prudential regulation in order to limit bank (and
insurance) exposure to a single borrower.
Several caveats must however be introduced:
• First, such a reform amounts to a fundamental
transformation of the financial systems of
euro-area countries. These are mostly bank-
based systems (rather than market-based
systems) and banks were used to considering
the government bond as the ultimate safe
asset. A different treatment of the government
bond would entail a chain of transformations of
major significance, affecting for example the
entire structure of pension funds assets. 
• Second, diversification would merely distribute
the risk more widely within the euro area. While
it would help break the national banks-
sovereign vicious circle, it would not make
default innocuous. The often-made comparison
with the US and the suggestion that adequate
regulation would allow the euro area to treat a
sovereign debt restructuring as a minor event
is largely misleading. The default of California,
the largest US state, would indeed be a
relatively minor financial event as its total debt
amounts to less than one per cent of US GDP. By
contrast the default of Italy, the country with
the largest debt in the euro area, would be a
major shock whatever the distribution of Italian
bond holdings because its debt amounts to 18
per cent of euro-area GDP (Figure 10). In fact
even Ireland, which ranks tenth in the euro area
by size of its public debt, has a greater debt as
a proportion of the monetary area’s GDP than
California. No financial tinkering will make the
default of a medium-sized euro-area member a
minor financial event. 
At any rate this diversification is far from
proceeding smoothly. As discussed in the
previous section, by mid-2011 banks had become
more, rather than less exposed to their own
sovereigns. Since they were asked in autumn
2011 by the European Banking Authority to
disclose their holdings of government debt and
value them at market prices, many bankers in the
euro area have embarked on a precipitous
disposal of government securities, which they
now see as reputationally damaging as well as a
source of earning volatility. As a consequence,
concerns have mounted about the ability of
southern European sovereigns to refinance
themselves on bond markets.
It may therefore be desirable to change the status
of government debt in the euro-area financial
system but it would be a mistake to assume that
this can be a quick, easy and adequate process.
Break the banking crisis-sovereign crisis vicious
circle: (b) a banking federation
The other aspect to banking reform would be to
move both the supervision of large banks and the
responsibility for rescuing them to European level,
as advocated for several years by many
independent observers and scholars (see for
example Véron, 2007). Mutualisation would end
the mismatch between tax revenues and the
states’ potential responsibilities, would help
reduce states' vulnerability in the face of banking
crises, and would therefore alleviate concerns
about their solvency.
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debts, US and euro area
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This reform would require creating fiscal capacity
at European level, firstly by assigning to the
European Financial Stability Facility the
responsibility for backstopping national deposit
insurance schemes (Véron, 2011), and secondly
by creating a permanent European Deposit
Insurance Corporation financed by banks but
benefitting from a backstop provided by the
official sector. To this end Marzinotto, Sapir and
Wolff (2011) propose to give the euro area the
right to levy taxes within the limit of 1 or 2 percent
of GDP. If exclusively devoted to this end, a limited
tax capacity of this sort would suffice to provide a
large enough and therefore credible backstop.
The dispute over the distribution of supervisory
and rescue responsibilities has been going on for
two decades. Advocates of European integration
and outside observers who assess arrangements
from an consistency perspective, have
consistently argued in favour of giving the
European level more responsibilities for banks of
pan-European dimension, without any significant
impact until the 2008 crisis. The creation of the
European Banking Authority and the European
Systemic Risk Board are significant steps in the
direction of a banking federation but thus far,
governments have consistently rejected any
move that potentially implies mutualising
budgetary resources. There is no indication that
they are willing to change attitude.
Establish a fiscal union
The third solution is to create a fiscal union among
the members of the euro area. This is an old
proposal, indeed a very old one as it was part of
the 1970 Werner report, the first blueprint for
creating a monetary union in Europe. At the time it
was thought, essentially on stabilisation and
distribution grounds, that a monetary union could
only be sustained if accompanied by the creation
of a federal budget. When the euro was created,
however, it was not accompanied by any increase
in the (very small) EU budget.
The fiscal union idea has now come back in very
different clothes. The question policymakers have
been debating since spring 2011 is not whether
to increase public spending at euro-area level, but
rather if there should be both a tighter common
fiscal framework and a mutual guarantee of part of
the public debt. Instead of maintaining the
responsibility of each country for its own debt, as
enshrined in the current treaty, debt would be
issued in the form of 'Eurobonds' benefitting from
mutual guarantee (all participating states would
technically be joint and several liable). As a quid
pro quo, states would have to lose the freedom to
issue debt at will (subject only to ex-post sanction
in case of infringement of common rules) and
they would need to accept submission of their
budgets for ex-ante approval. Should a draft
budget fail to respect common principles, it could
be vetoed by partner countries before entering
into force.
Different variants of Eurobonds have been
proposed, from the original Blue Bond/Red Bond
proposal of Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010) to
the Redemption bonds of the German Council of
Economic Experts (2011) and the Eurobills of
Hellwig and Philippon (2011). The European
Commission (2011) has outlined what it calls
'stability bonds'. What these proposals have in
common is that they all envisage the creation of a
class of assets benefitting from the joint
guarantee of participating governments15. In the
case of default by one, the guarantee would be
invoked and the other governments would assume
the corresponding liability. This would make these
assets both super-safe and representative of the
euro area as whole. They would also be liquid
because of the large size of the corresponding
market. It is therefore expected that overseas
investors would, eventually at least, find them
attractive.
Eurobonds would in principle have three types of
benefits. First a new, safer asset class would be
created. Eurobonds should constitute the prime
investment vehicle for banks and other investors
in search of safety. Second, states able to issue
under the scheme would benefit from favourable
borrowing conditions. Banks would be more
secure and states would be protected from self-
fulfilling solvency crises. Third, by subscribing to
Eurobonds and their necessary counterpart – a
thorough scrutiny of national public finances –
the members of the euro area would signal their
willingness to accept the full consequences of
participation in the monetary union.
15. The Commission
considers also limited
guarantee as an option.
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It should be noted that the first benefit could also
be secured without Eurobonds through the
creation of synthetic asset-based securities, as
proposed by Brunnermeier et al (2011) under the
name of ESBies. As for the second, it should be
observed that (abstracting from liquidity and
incentive effects) a Blue Bond scheme à la Delpla-
Weizsäcker would not change a sovereign’s total
cost of borrowing: the yield on the blue part would
decrease and that on the red part would increase,
leaving the average constant16. However it would
protect states from acute funding crises as they
would always retain access to issuance, at least
for amounts corresponding to the redemption of
maturing blue debt.
There are significant obstacles to Eurobonds. First,
Eurobonds and ex-ante approval would represent
a major step in the process of European
integration. Such as step would require a
significant revision of the treaty in order to
substitute for the current 'no-responsibility
principle' a different principle based on the
combination of solidarity and ex-ante approval.
This ex-ante approval would have to be legally and
effectively enforceable in case of disagreement
between the European and national levels.
Second, the potential benefits from Eurobonds
would be unevenly distributed. Germany in
particular benefits from a safe-haven effect and
would almost certainly experience higher
borrowing costs, with consequences for its public
finances. From a German perspective such a
choice could therefore only make sense as an
investment into the sustainability and the stability
of the euro area. For Germany to agree on making
such an investment, firm guarantees from its
partners would inevitably be required, starting
with the acceptance of a surrender of budgetary
sovereignty.
Third and not least, a system of ex-ante control
and veto, without which no Eurobond could be
lastingly stable, requires political integration. The
body exercising the veto could not possibly be a
partner country, but would rather be an EU/euro-
area body, either the Court of Justice or a
parliamentary body consisting of representatives
from the European Parliament and national
parliaments. This EU body would rely on the
primacy of European law over public law, but a
degree of political integration would also be
required to confer legitimacy on the potential veto
of a national parliament vote. In order to provide
stability, Eurobonds would therefore need to be
supported by a new institutional framework.
Without an agreement to create such a framework,
Germany's reluctance about Eurobonds – or at
least its great caution – is therefore
understandable, especially in view of France’s
refusal to contemplate federalist solutions17.
Against this background proposals such as those
of the German Council of Economic Experts
(2011) and of Hellwig and Philippon (2011) have
the significant advantage of being reversible.
Unlike the move to a fully-fledged Blue Bonds
scheme, they could be implemented on an
experimental basis and be used to build trust –
arguably the scarcest commodity on the European
scene.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The euro area is fighting for survival and its leaders
have given every possible indication that they
intend to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save it. Yet their
discussions and the search for solutions are
based on a partial diagnosis that puts excessive
emphasis on the lack of enforcement of the
existing fiscal rules. True, poor enforcement has
been one of the causes of the current difficulties.
True, ambitious budgetary consolidation is
required. But the budgetary dimension is by no
means the only one, not even the most important
one18. Europe’s fiscal obsession has deep roots in
the history of EMU, but to look at the problems
through the fiscal lens only is a recipe for
disappointment.
The European leaders would be well advised to
16. This is a consequence
of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem.
17. This reluctance was
very explicitly stated in
Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in
Toulon on 1 December
2011.
18. One should also distin-
guish between problems in
the enforcement of the SGP
and problems in the design
of the fiscal rule. Arguably,
the latter are at least as
important as the former.
‘The euro area is fighting for survival, yet the search for solutions is based on a partial diagnosis
that puts excessive emphasis on the lack of enforcement of the existing fiscal rules. But the
budgetary dimension is by no means the only one, not even the most important one.’
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Turning to the feasibility of the three options, the
least feasible is probably to change the mandate
of the ECB in a way that would lastingly affect the
rules of the game and their perception by markets.
It is one thing for the ECB to possibly step up its
intervention in response to an escalation of
financial tensions, and it is another to let markets
understand that it would permanently behave in
a way that ensures continued access to liquidity
for solvent sovereigns. Even a change in the
mandate, to include financial stability, would not
be enough to quell impediments to future action
resulting from strong reservations in important
parts of the Eurosystem, and tensions between
the governance structure and the nature of the
decisions to be taken. Effective deterrence implies
that one is able to credibly commit overwhelming
forces, and the ECB is simply not in a position to
give such a commitment.
The building of a banking federation involves more
than one reform. The setting of regulatory limits
on bank exposure to any single borrower, euro-
area or EU supervision of large banks, the creation
of a common deposit insurance scheme
backstopped by a common fiscal resource, and, in
the medium run, support for national insurance
schemes by the EFSF/ESM, are important aspects.
None of these reforms amounts to an overhaul of
the EMU structure; rather they are mostly natural
consequences of the single currency that have
been delayed for political reasons. However, the
process of financial reform is bound to be complex
and political economy obstacles are significant.
Governments have strong incentive to resist this
move. As noted by Carmen Reinhart and Belen
Sbrancia (2011), periods of public deleveraging
have historically been accompanied by financial
repression, which is exactly opposite to what the
envisaged transformation is about. Furthermore,
any reform in this field raises the sensitive issue
of EU versus euro-area responsibility. For these
reasons incremental progress is likely, but a
breakthrough is less likely.
This leaves fiscal union as the field in which
‘Against the background of widespread doubts about the viability of the euro area, the lack of
clear-cut solutions contributes to lingering policy uncertainty. A strong case can therefore be
made for comprehensive reform involving simultaneous moves on more than one front.’
take a broader view and contemplate reforms that
would address the inherent weaknesses of the
euro area that were revealed by the crisis.
In this paper I have emphasised that an
impossible trinity of no-coresponsibility over
public debt, strict no-monetary financing and
bank-sovereign interdependence is at the core of
euro-area vulnerability. I have assessed the
corresponding three options for reform – a broader
mandate for the ECB, the building of a banking
federation, and fiscal union with common bonds
– and I have argued that none is easy. Economic,
legal and political obstacles make all three
difficult. This explains why Europe is agonising
over reform choices.
The two important questions for the future are,
first, if it would be sufficient to concentrate on one
of the three options only and, second, what is their
relative feasibility.
Progress on any of the three fronts would help
address the fragility of EMU. But the options
outlined in this paper are by no means
contradictory. At the stage the crisis has reached,
comprehensive action is desirable, if only because
of inevitable delays in the transition to a new
regime. The only change that can be introduced
almost overnight is the introduction of a new ECB
policy stance, but such a stance without a change
in the mandate and/or the governance of the
central bank would hardly be regarded as
permanent by markets. The other changes, the
building of a banking federation and the
establishment of a fiscal union, are of a medium-
term nature. Political agreement to act can be
reached in the short term, but implementation is
bound to take years and credibility will only build
up gradually. Against the background of
widespread doubts about the viability of the euro
area, the unavailability of clear-cut solutions
contributes to lingering policy uncertainty. A
strong case can therefore be made for
comprehensive reform involving simultaneous
moves on more than one front.
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decisions by European leaders could change the
game and create the basis for a return to stability.
True, there are major political obstacles on the
road, not least because, as indicated in this paper,
the issuance of Eurobonds implies ex-ante
approval of national budgets, which in turn implies
a form of political union. By the same token,
however, a decision to move in this direction would
portend a stronger EMU and would be regarded in
this way by markets and the ECB. One possibility
would be to introduce a limited, experimental
scheme that would rebuild trust. This would also
leave time for negotiations on political union.
There is not only one way out of the euro crisis.
There are several possible choices, or at least sev-
eral possible short-term priorities. But one at least
has to be selected for implementation, because to
not choose any would amount to keeping the euro
area in a state of dangerous fragility.
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